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Introduction
MANY PROBLEMS ARISE in applying limitations periods to rescis-
sion claims. For purposes of this Article, “rescission” refers to when
the court cancels a contract, as opposed to when the parties to the
contract cancel the contract without the court’s assistance.1 These
problems become apparent when attorneys raise claims for rescission
in response to court rulings that the contracts do not mean what the
attorneys say they mean.
Consider the following scenario. During the course of litigation
regarding a contract, the trial judge rules that a provision of the con-
tract is unenforceable. In response, the plaintiff amends his complaint
to plead a claim for rescission on the basis of mutual mistake, alleging
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regarding this Article and enthusiasm in assisting me with the issues raised herein, and
Heather Kolinsky for her unwavering support and assistance with this endeavor.
1. The definition of rescission is discussed more fully at Part I infra. This Article also
does not address repudiation, which differs from rescission in that repudiation occurs
when a party to the contract informs the other party that she will breach the contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 (1981). Rescission, as discussed in this Article,
is when the court cancels the contract and restores the parties to the status quo, rather
than awarding damages to either party based on an alleged breach. 13 AM. JUR. 2D Cancella-
tion of Instruments § 1 (2009).
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that the parties mistakenly believed the provision was enforceable. To
perfect his rescission claim, the plaintiff returns the money he re-
ceived under the contract to the defendant during this same litiga-
tion. The defendant then moves for dismissal of the rescission claim,
arguing that it is barred by the running of the limitations period. The
defendant contends that the contract was executed over five years
ago,2 and the plaintiff knew or should have known that the provision
was invalid at that time.
The plaintiff counters the limitations defense by arguing the limi-
tations period only begins to run when the last element needed for
rescission occurs. Because the plaintiff only recently fulfilled that last
element by returning the benefits he received under the contract to
the defendant, the limitations period has not yet run.
If the plaintiff is correct, then the plaintiff controls when the limi-
tations period begins to run. Putting this power into the plaintiff’s
hands is inherently unfair. The plaintiff may wait until memories fade
and witnesses become unavailable before bringing his rescission
claim, to the detriment of the defendant. A cursory reading of the law
regarding limitations periods, however, seems to dictate this unfair re-
sult. This Article offers a solution to this unjustness: the limitations
period should begin to run when the act supporting the rescission
claim occurs. Part I defines rescission, and Part II addresses whether
laches or statutes of limitations should apply to rescission claims.
Next, Part III reviews the different approaches regarding when the
limitations period for rescission begins to run and the advantages and
disadvantages of these approaches. Part IV discusses several different
solutions to the limitations problems. The Article then concludes by
positing which solution best addresses the issues.
I. What Is Recission?
Before contemplating the problems in applying limitations peri-
ods to rescission, rescission must first be defined. In the past, several
meanings were ascribed to “rescission.”3 It was used to refer to various
situations, including the following: when the parties to a contract
agree to abandon the contract; when one party cancels a contract due
to the other party’s breach; and when a party sought to avoid a con-
2. Due to the excessive demands placed on limited court resources, it is not unusual
for parties to litigate issues regarding a contract executed more than five years before the
litigation.
3. United States v. Scruggs, 356 F.3d 539, 545 (4th Cir. 2004).
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tract, usually due to fraud or incapacity.4 The Uniform Commercial
Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts uses rescission to
refer to the parties’ mutual assent to abandon the contract.5 A good
working definition of rescission is when a court cancels a contract and
restores the parties to the contract to the status quo, i.e., the status
they held prior to entering into the contract.6
But can one rescind a contract when it is impossible for the par-
ties to the contract to be returned to the status quo? Some authorities
contend that there are exceptions to the rule that the parties must be
capable of being returned to the status quo for the court to decree
rescission.7 Professor Andrew Kull argues that “the traditional require-
ment that performance be fully returnable has been greatly relaxed by
a series of accommodations,”8 including when the plaintiff received
an incidental benefit from the temporary possession of an item pur-
chased from the defendant, or when the benefit is “impossible to re-
store and difficult to value.”9 Kull also includes “[a]ny obstacle to the
restoration of performance that is attributable in some manner to de-
fendant’s fault,[10] or to a defect constituting a breach of defendant’s
warranty” among those circumstances where restoration of the status
quo as an essential part of rescission will be excused.11 In addition, he
notes that the courts are more willing now than they were in the past
to permit a monetary payment to substitute for restoration of the sta-
tus quo.12 Kull concludes that courts are not reluctant to order rescis-
sion in cases even when the court must determine the value of the
4. See id.
5. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 3 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 283 cmt. a
(1981); Scruggs, 356 F.3d at 545.
6. 13 AM. JUR. 2D Cancellation of Instruments § 1 (2010).
7. Sol Goodell, Need Rescission Be Sought Within a Reasonable Time?, 8 TEX. L. REV. 342,
368 (1930).
8. Andrew Kull, Restitution As a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465,
1496 (1994).
9. Id.
10. Kull cites Timmerman v. Stanley, 51 S.E. 760, 762 (Ga. 1905), where the court found
that the plaintiff could pursue a rescission claim, even though the plaintiff could not re-
turn the instruction the plaintiff received to the defendant. Kull, supra note 8, at 1496 n.7.
In Timmerman, the court specifically noted:
[The defendant could not] by his own conduct place himself in a situation where
restoration is impossible, repudiate the contract, and set up this situation as a
defense to a suit for the amount paid. If he abandons the contract, he should not
complain that the other party is willing to treat it as rescinded.
Timmerman, 51 S.E. at 762.
11. Kull, supra note 8, at 1496.
12. Id.
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contractual exchange.13 Thus, although the definition of rescission in-
cludes the ability of the parties to be returned to the status quo, in
practice this may not be required.
“Legal rescission” refers to the circumstance in which one of the
parties to the contract unilaterally cancels the contract because the
other party committed a material breach of the agreement or because
of some other valid reason.14 In contrast, equitable rescission refers to
the situation when one of the parties to the contract asks the court to
nullify the contract.15 This Article focuses on equitable rescission, as it
would be the court that would apply a limitations period.
Courts now recognize certain elements as being essential to main-
taining rescission. These include: the character or relation of the par-
ties (i.e., whether there is contractual privity);16 the making of a valid
contract; whether there is ground for rescission, including mistake,
misrepresentation, or impossibility or impracticability of perform-
ance;17 whether the party has rescinded the contract and notified the
other party of rescission; whether the rescinding party returned the
benefits she received from the contract, if such a return is possible;18
and whether unusual equity exists, such as fraud, mistake, “turpitude
of consideration,” or the party has no adequate remedy at law.19
II. Laches or Statutes of Limitations?
Limitations periods are reviewed in two separate, but not necessa-
rily different, contexts: statutes of limitations and the doctrine of
laches.20 Traditionally, statutes of limitations did not apply to equita-
ble claims.21 Instead, stale equitable claims were precluded by
13. Id.
14. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Builders, Inc., 934 P.2d 257, 262 n.6 (Nev. 1997).
15. See 13 AM. JUR. 2D Cancellation of Instruments § 1 (2010); Great Am. Ins. Co., 934 P.2d
at 262 n.6.
16. “In order to maintain an action for rescission of contract, the parties to the lawsuit
must lie in contractual privity.” Bland v. Freightliner LLC, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1206
(M.D. Fla. 2002).
17. In the hypothetical at the beginning of this Article, the ground for rescission is
the mutual mistake of the parties that the contractual provision was enforceable.
18. “This rule is based on the equitable maxim that he who would have equity must
do equity.” Smith v. Merck, 57 S.E.2d 326, 333 (Ga. 1950). This element is also discussed in
terms of the court being able to return the parties to the status quo.
19. Crown Ice Mach. Leasing Co. v. Sam Senter Farms, Inc., 174 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
20. Gammill v. The Bradley T, 879 F. Supp. 737, 740 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
21. Virginia C. Mining, Milling & Smelting Co. v. Clayton, 233 S.W. 215, 218 (Mo.
1921).
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laches.22 Thus, it appears this Article should address problems in ap-
plying laches to rescission, rather than statutes of limitations to
rescission.
The difference between laches and statutes of limitations may be
without relevant distinction, however. In many states, the same time
period set forth in the statutes of limitations is also the same time
period used to determine if laches bars an equitable claim.23 For ex-
ample, under section 95.11(6) of the Florida Statute, laches bars any
action that would be barred under a statute of limitations concerning
the same subject matter.24 In addition, the Florida Statute omits the
usual element of laches that distinguishes it from statutes of limita-
tions: the defendant must suffer some injury due to that passage of
time to preclude the plaintiff from succeeding on the claim.25 The
Florida Statute specifically states that the time period applies “regard-
less of . . . whether the person sought to be held liable is injured or
prejudiced by the delay.”26
Because at least one jurisdiction has not only eliminated that dis-
tinguishing characteristic of laches from laches itself, and other juris-
dictions have decreed that the time period for laches is the same as
that of the statute of limitations, there is no practical difference in
applying statutes of limitations, rather than laches, to rescission
claims.27 For example, in Hogue v. Pellerin Laundry Machinery Sales
Co.,28 the defendant argued that the statute of limitations barred the
plaintiff’s claim to rescind a contract for laundry equipment.29 The
Eighth Circuit, applying Arkansas law, noted that both courts of equity
22. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 8 (2010).
23. See generally Michael E. Baughman, Defining the Boundaries of the Adverse Domination
Doctrine: Is There Any Repose for Corporate Directors?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1072 (1995) (“By
the end of the nineteenth century, equity courts generally adopted the limitation periods
found in analogous statutes of limitations at law.”).
24. Specifically regarding rescission, this issue would not arise in Florida, as Florida
Statute section 95.11(3)(l) (2009) provides a four-year statute of limitations for “[a]n ac-
tion to rescind a contract.”
25. Katherine A. McDowell, Note, The Doctrine of Laches in Florida: A Statutory Hybrid?,
13 STETSON L. REV. 446, 455 (1984) (“Thus, the statute would not be applicable in two sets
of circumstances: if the time period for commencing analogous cases at law had not yet
expired; or if no time period existed for commencing an analogous action at law.”).
26. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (2009).
27. Hogue v. Pellerin Laundry Mach. Sales Co., 353 F.2d 772, 774 n.2 (8th Cir. 1965).
But see Laurie v. Thomas, 294 S.E.2d 78, 81–82 (W. Va. 1982) (applying laches to suit to
rescind a deed based on fraud, not statute of limitations, as rescission is an equitable
claim).
28. 353 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1965).
29. Id. at 774.
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as well as courts of law are bound by the statute of limitations—not
laches.30 The plaintiff’s claim for rescission was not barred by the stat-
ute of limitations, even though the defendant defaulted on some of
the payments earlier than three years (the statute-of-limitations pe-
riod) prior to the plaintiff filing suit, because defaulting on the pay-
ments did not accelerate the total amount due.31 These later defaults
over the five-year period may actually be within the statute of limita-
tions period and would therefore not be barred by the statute. “Thus,
failure of performance as to a subsequent installment as much consti-
tuted a contract breach and as much legally provided a basis for rescis-
sion as did the first default that occurred.”32 The court noted that only
the statute of limitations was attempted to be used by the defendant:
“There is no claim of any preclusion from laches prior to and other
than as a question of bar by the statute itself.”33
Interestingly, although the doctrine of laches predated statutes of
limitations, courts of equity “began to refer to the statute as furnishing
a convenient measure of the length of time that ought to bar a partic-
ular equitable demand.”34 In cases as early as the seventeenth century,
courts of equity applied the statute of limitations for the cause of ac-
tion most analogous to the claim before it.35
Although rescission is an equitable claim, it is more likely that a
statute of limitations will be applied to it, rather than a strict applica-
tion of laches. As discussed above, many jurisdictions that do retain
laches look to the statute of limitations for the most analogous claim
to determine whether a sufficient length of time has elapsed to im-
pose laches. Other areas have eliminated the distinguishing character-
istic of laches; that is, requiring harm to the defendant due to the
delay. Still others have specifically set forth a statute of limitations for
rescission, thus obviating the need to apply laches. Litigants will there-
fore encounter similar problems in applying laches to rescission as
they would if the statute of limitations is applied instead.36
30. Id. at 774 n.2.
31. Id. at 774.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Goodell, supra note 7, at 344.
35. Id. at 344, 344 n.10; see also Ludwig v. Scott, 65 S.W.2d 1034, 1035 (Mo. 1933)
(“Our statutes of limitations apply alike to legal and equitable actions.”), rev’d on other
grounds, Dreckshage v. Cmty. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n, 555 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Mo. 1977).
36. Hogue, 353 F.2d at 356.
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III. Different Approaches to When the Claim for Rescission
Begins to Accrue
In analyzing the application of limitations periods to rescission
claims, it must be determined when the limitations period should be-
gin to run. There are several choices, which include when the last
element of rescission occurs37 or when the plaintiff suffers actual
harm and has notice of the invasion of her legal rights.38 In addition,
rather than picking a particular act from which the limitations period
should commence, some courts have decided that rescission must be
sought within a reasonable time.39 By answering the question of when
the limitations period should begin to run, solutions to the problems
of applying limitations periods to rescission claims can be ascertained,
as determining when the time period begins to accrue tends to cause
the most litigation regarding limitations periods.
A. The Limitations Period Begins to Run When the Last Element
of Rescission Occurs
In many jurisdictions, the limitations period begins to run when
the last element of the cause of action occurs.40 If this is the case, then
the court must know the elements of rescission. As noted above, the
elements of rescission are as follows: (1) the character or relation of
the parties (i.e., privity of contract); (2) the making of a contract; (3)
a ground for rescission, including mistake, misrepresentations, or im-
possibility or impracticability of performance; (4) the party has re-
scinded the contract and notified the other party of rescission; (5) the
rescinding party returned the benefits she received from the contract,
if such a return is possible; and (6) an unusual equity exists, such as
fraud, mistake, “turpitude of consideration,” or the party has no ade-
quate remedy at law.41
Of the elements listed above, the party seeking rescission has con-
trol over at least two of them. The party seeking rescission decides
when to rescind the contract and notify the other party of rescission.
37. See FLA. STAT. § 95.031 (2009).
38. Hughes v. Papich, 553 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
39. Miller v. Reynolds, 223 S.E.2d 883, 886 (Va. 1976).
40. See Frank E. Kulbaski III, Statutes of Repose and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Time for a
New Interpretation, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2000) (noting that the time for filing suit
does not commence until the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues, and “in most jurisdictions,
. . . a cause of action does not accrue until all requisite elements of a cause of action have
occurred”).
41. Crown Ice Mach. Leasing Co. v. Sam Senter Farms, Inc., 174 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965); see also 13 AM. JUR. 2D Cancellation of Instruments § 51 (2010).
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In addition, the party seeking rescission decides when to return, or
attempt to return, the benefits she received under the contract.42
Thus, the party that wants to rescind the contract can control when
the limitations period begins to run if it begins to run when the last ele-
ment of rescission occurs.
For example, suppose that a young man decides to enlist in the
Navy, based on representations made by the recruiter that he can be-
come a member of an air crew.43 Despite these representations, and
after completing seven years of training, the enlistee is not permitted
to become a member of an air crew due to a physical condition. The
enlistee now, seven years after he made the agreement, notifies the
Navy of his intent to rescind his agreement based on the misrepresen-
tation that he could become a member of the air crew.
Now suppose that the recruiter that made the misrepresentations
to the enlistee passed away during those seven years.44 The second
party has a genuine proof problem that was not of its doing, as the
witness best able to address the issue raised in the litigation is no
longer available.45 Additionally, it is precisely such proof problems
42. Some courts hold that the return or offer to return must be made before the
complaint is filed and may not be made for the first time in the complaint. Williams v.
Fouche, 121 S.E. 217, 217 (Ga. 1924). If this is considered an element of a claim for rescis-
sion, though, the plaintiff still controls when the limitations period begins to run, as the
plaintiff’s rescission claim is not perfected until such a return or offer to return is com-
plete. The plaintiff must only file his lawsuit within the limitations period following his
return or offer to return the contract benefits to prevent his claim from being barred as
untimely, even if such offer was made a decade after the contract was executed. In addi-
tion, commentators have noted that, at least regarding equitable rescission, rescission can
be granted even when the plaintiff has not made such an offer, because the court, in
ordering rescission, will order the plaintiff to return the consideration received. 27 WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS § 69:50 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed., 2009).
43. This hypothetical situation is based on Brown v. Dunleavy, 722 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D.
Va. 1989).
44. Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(e) (1981), negotiations
that result in a contract are admissible to establish a ground for rescission. Thus, in this
example, the parol evidence rule would not preclude the recruiter’s testimony, if he were
still alive.
45. For an example of the proof problems in litigating a contract case where one of
the parties to the contract has passed away, see Rosenfeld v. Basquiat, 78 F.3d 84 (2d Cir.
1996) where, after two trials, the appellate court ruled that one party to a contract could
not testify as to the circumstances surrounding formation of the contract with the now-
deceased other party to the contract. Interestingly, after two trials and one appeal, the
plaintiff lost this case based on the statute of limitations. The jury found that the deceased
intended to deliver the paintings that were the subject of the contract following a particu-
lar art exhibition, and the plaintiff filed suit more than five years after the deceased failed
to make the delivery. Rosenfeld v. Basquiat, No. 89 Civ. 7702(HB), 1997 WL 363814, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1997).
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that limitations periods are designed to protect against.46 If the limita-
tions period does not begin to run until the last element of the claim
occurs, however, then this purpose is thwarted.
Courts have addressed the issue of plaintiffs having control over
when the limitations period begins to accrue by holding that the
plaintiff must complete the condition precedent within a reasonable
time,47 e.g., a party cannot indefinitely delay the statute of limitations
from beginning to accrue.48 The problem with this approach is that in
most cases the question of reasonableness will go to a jury, and thus
the defendant will still have to prepare her case based on a stale claim,
as the limitations issue will not be decided before trial. Necessarily,
the limitations bar cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, as judges do not typically decide what is “reasona-
ble” on these non-evidentiary motions. For example, in Templeton et
ux. v. Oliver H. Russ Piano Co.,49 the jury was asked to determine
whether the litigant rescinded the contract in a reasonable time. It
answered the question in the negative.50 This demonstrates that if the
reasonable time approach is followed, then litigants may be forced to
prepare for trial without the benefit of evidence that was lost due to
the passage of time.
B. The Limitations Period Begins to Run When the Plaintiff
Suffers Actual Harm and Has Notice of the Invasion of
Her Legal Rights
Another option courts have in determining when the limitations
period should begin to accrue is to start the clock when the plaintiff
suffers actual harm and has notice of the invasion of her legal rights.
46. See Goodell, supra note 7, at 343 (Statutes of limitation were intended “to afford
security from stale claims after the transactions giving rise to them may have become ob-
scure by loss of evidence . . . .”).
47. Wisler v. Ca. State Bd. of Accountancy, 288 P.2d 322, 325–26 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1955).
48. Weston v. Jones, 199 N.W. 431, 433 (Minn. 1924).
49. 17 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1929).
50. Id. at 476. In comparison, the court noted in Henson v. James M. Barker Co., 636 So.
2d 887, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), that if there are disputed issues of fact, then a jury
would determine whether the contract was rescinded within a reasonable time, but if there
were no disputed issues of fact, then a judge could make that determination. The Henson
case, however, did not rest on a statute of limitations or laches argument; instead, the
appellants argued that the appellees waived their right to rescission by failing to rescind
within a reasonable time. Id. at 889.
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At least one case has followed this approach in evaluating
whether the statute of limitations precluded a rescission claim.51 In
the Florida case of Hughes v. Papich,52 the appellant sought rescission,
and the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant,
finding that the statute of limitations precluded the claim.53 The ap-
pellate court reversed, finding that the “action may not have been
barred by the statute of limitations.”54
In Hughes, the appellant bought a condominium, and as part of
the purchase, became obligated to make sublease payments to the
condominium association for his portion of a land lease that the asso-
ciation had with a third party.55 Before the appellant bought the
condo, however, the association had agreed to buy the land lease from
the third party56 and to allow each member of the condominium asso-
ciation to buy the portion of the land associated with that member’s
unit.57 Because the appellant was not yet a member of the association,
he did not receive notice of the opportunity to buy the land associated
with his unit,58 and the condominium association, instead, bought the
land relating to the appellant’s unit.59 The former president of the
condominium association then transferred and assigned the appel-
lant’s land lease to himself.60 Later, the association notified the appel-
lant that he was no longer obligated to make sublease payments for
that land.61 Following that, the association claimed that the former
president did not make the required payments, and thus the associa-
tion still owned the land associated with the appellant’s unit.62 Based
on this information, the appellant stopped the sublease payments.63
Consequently, the former president filed a lien on the appellant’s unit
for failure to make the payments.64 When the former president filed
an action to foreclose the lien, the appellant sought to rescind the
transfer to the former president.65 The appellant’s request for rescis-
51. Hughes v. Papich, 553 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 755.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 756.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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sion came at least five years after he had notice of the association’s
purchase of the land lease and three years after the former president’s
attempt to purchase the land lease.66
The appellate court used subsections (3)(j),67 (l),68 and (p)69 of
section 95.11 of the Florida Statute, to apply a four-year statute of limi-
tations.70 It found that the evidence could show that the appellant did
not discover the transfer to the former president until within four
years of when the appellant sought rescission, and it was not until the
former president filed the lien that the appellant became aware of the
harm.71 Thus, the court held that the statute of limitations began to
run when the appellant suffered harm and had notice of the invasion
of his legal rights.72 In reversing the trial court’s decision, the appel-
late court stated that the statute of limitations could still bar the appel-
lant’s claim if the appellant knew earlier of the former president’s
actions.73
There was one case regarding the statute of limitations and rescis-
sion before Hughes, however. A different Florida appellate court deter-
mined Allie v. Ionata,74 which addressed the appellants’ argument that
the statute of limitations for rescission had expired.75 After stating the
appellant’s argument that the rescission claim began to run when the
contract was executed, the court in Allie interpreted section 95.031 of
the Florida Statute to hold the appellant’s rescission claim began to
run when the contract was executed.76 Section 95.031 states the stat-
ute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues and
“[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the
66. Id. at 755–56.
67. Subsection (3) of Florida Statute section 95.11 describes those actions that must
be brought within four years; sub-subsection (j) pertains to “[a] legal or equitable action
founded on fraud.” FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(j) (1983).
68. Statute of limitations on actions to rescind a contract. Id. § 95.11(3)(l).
69. Providing a four-year statute of limitations on “[a]ny action not specifically pro-
vided for in these statutes.” Id. § 95.11(3)(p).
70. Hughes, 553 So. 2d at 756.
71. Id.
72. Id. The court did not address whether the notice had to be actual or whether it
could be constructive, but, because of its directions on remand that the trial court deter-
mine whether “appellant knew of [the former president’s] actions earlier,” it appears that
the court was only concerned with actual notice. Id.
73. Id.
74. 417 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
75. Id. at 1078.
76. Id. at 1078–79. The court implicitly accepted the appellants’ argument by re-
jecting the appellees’ arguments regarding why the four-year statute of limitations should
not apply and specifically stating that the four-year period did apply. Id.
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cause of action occurs.”77 Rather than computing the time period
from when the last element of rescission occurred, as the Allie court
had implicitly endorsed, the Hughes court followed the “actual harm
suffered and notice of invasion of legal rights” time period, but did
not explain why it did so.78 The Hughes court did not cite either the
Allie case or  section 95.031.
Actual harm suffered and notice of invasion of a legal right is
similar to the discovery rule.79 The discovery rule, and thus the rule
that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff
has notice of the invasion of his legal rights, is unnecessary in rescis-
sion cases if the court follows the proscription that the statute of limi-
tations begins to run when the last element of rescission occurs. Two
elements of rescission include: (1) that the party notifies the other
party of the intent to rescind, and (2) that the rescinding party re-
turns the benefit received under the contract to the other party.80 The
plaintiff will not complete these elements of the claim unless the
plaintiff has suffered harm and has notice of the invasion of his legal
rights, as the plaintiff would not notify the defendant of the intent to
rescind without a reason for wanting to rescind, i.e., suffering some
harm. Thus, if the court follows the rule that the limitations period
does not begin to run until the last element of rescission is completed,
the plaintiff will also fulfill the discovery rule requirement that the
plaintiff suffer actual harm and have notice of the invasion of her le-
gal rights. On the surface, it appears that courts should decree that
the limitations period will begin to run when the last element of re-
scission is completed since, in practice, this incorporates the discovery
rule. As discussed in Part III.A. above, however, the plaintiff decides
when she gives notice of the intent to rescind, and thus she can con-
trol when the last element of rescission happens. Therefore, it is not
recommended that the courts follow this approach, even though it
incorporates the discovery rule.
77. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(1) (2009).
78. Hughes, 553 So. 2d at 756.
79. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 116 (2009) (defining the discovery rule as the
limitations period not beginning to run until the plaintiff knows or should know of her
claim).
80. See supra Part I.
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C. If Rescission Is Based on Mutual Mistake, Then the Limitations
Period Begins to Run When the Mistake Was or Should
Have Been Discovered
One basis for rescission is the mistake of both parties regarding
the contract that was executed between them.81 An example is when
both parties thought that a contractual provision was enforceable or
meant something different than the meaning subsequently ascribed
by a judge.82 Another example of mutual mistake is when the buyer
and seller of a piece of land believe the zoning for the land is compati-
ble with the buyer’s proposed use, but then, unbeknownst to the
buyer and seller, the zoning is changed to prohibit the buyer’s pro-
posed use following execution of the contract for sale, but before clos-
ing, and the new zoning is applied retroactively so that technically it
was in existence on the date the contract was entered into.83
Many states start the clock for the limitations period on a rescis-
sion claim founded upon the mutual mistake of the parties from the
time the mistake was or should have been discovered.84 This is done
regardless of whether that cause of action is for rescission or some
other relief, such as reformation.85 The “should have been discov-
ered” aspect of this method of determining when the limitations pe-
riod begins to run usually indicates the time period by which the party
to the contract exercising ordinary diligence would have discovered
the mistake.86
In at least one case, however, the court was not noticeably con-
cerned with whether the purchasers of a lot should have discovered
the mistake sooner than they did. In Wedge v. Security-First National
Bank of Los Angeles,87 the purchasers of a lot sought rescission more
than five years after the contract was formed.88 The purchasers did
not discover that a residence could not be built on the property until
they had raised enough money to begin building, which led them to
81. See id.
82. See supra Introduction.
83. See Dover Pool & Racquet Club, Inc. v. Brooking, 322 N.E.2d 168 (Mass. 1975).
The court specifically found that the situation before it constituted a mutual mistake,
rather than frustration of purpose. Id. at 170–71.
84. Goodell, supra note 7, at 354; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337(3) (West 2006)
(“Where the ground for rescission is . . . mistake, the time does not begin to run until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the . . . mistake.”).
85. Goodell, supra note 7, at 354.
86. Id. at 355.
87. 25 P.2d 411 (Cal. 1933).
88. Id. at 411.
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find out that a condemnation prevented any feasible residence on the
property.89 The seller argued that either the statute of limitations or
laches prevented the purchasers from rescinding the contract.90 First,
the court determined that, although the condemnation was in the
public records, this did not preclude rescission based on the limita-
tions period.91 The seller’s agent convinced the purchasers not to use
a title company and secure an abstract because the seller was a reputa-
ble bank.92 The court noted that a title report, which the defendant’s
agent implicitly discouraged the plaintiffs from obtaining, would have
revealed the condemnation.93
Second, in specifically addressing whether the limitations period
had expired, the court was concerned with how the purchasers acted
during the contract’s existence and when they discovered the mis-
take.94 The court found that the purchasers acted promptly once they
discovered the mistake.95 The purchasers sent written notices to the
seller of their intention to rescind the contract within one month of
discovering the condemnation.96 The court was also impressed that
the purchasers paid more than two-thirds of the purchase price at the
time the contract was formed and made payments under the contract
until they learned of the mistake.97 Thus, the court seemed to rely
more on the purchasers’ behavior under the contract after the mis-
take was discovered, rather than whether the purchasers could have
discovered the mistake earlier through ordinary diligence.
Using the time when the mistake should have been discovered to
determine when the limitations period begins to run does not provide
a clear-cut rule for litigants and, instead, promotes future litigation. It
is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately predict how a judge or jury
will rule on the issue of when the mistake “should have been discov-
ered.”98 Without a clear-cut rule, the only method to find the answer
is to go to court, thus not providing any incentives to the contracting
89. Id. at 413.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. This may only be avoided if the mistake is discovered within the limitations pe-
riod. If it is, then the statute of limitations or the laches defense is presumably without
merit in those jurisdictions where the limitations period on the claim begins to run when
the mistake is or should have been discovered.
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parties to avoid litigation. Therefore, other ways to determine when
the limitations period begins to run would be preferable to using the
date the mistake should have been discovered.
D. If Rescission Is Based on Mistake, Then the Limitations Period
Begins to Run from the Date the Mistake Was Made
As discussed above, many jurisdictions hold the limitations period
for a cause of action based on mistake begins to run when the mistake
was or should have been discovered.99 In contrast to this approach,
other jurisdictions find the limitations period begins when the mis-
take was actually made.100 In these cases, the mistake is deemed made
when the contract is formed.101
In Mills v. Everest Reinsurance Co.,102 the rehabilitator of an insur-
ance company that became insolvent filed suit against the insurance
company’s reinsurer in an attempt to rescind the reinsurance con-
tract.103 The rehabilitator claimed rescission should be granted due to
a mutual mistake,104 and the reinsurer moved to dismiss the claim for
rescission as untimely.105
The court found the statute of limitations “period [began] to run
when the alleged mistake or actionable wrong occurred—in this case,
when the agreement was formed.”106 As the court stated, “[t]he rele-
vant inquiry then is when the reinsurance agreement . . . was
formed.”107 The rehabilitator argued the contract was not formed un-
til the formal reinsurance policy was signed.108 Even if a formal con-
99. Goodell, supra note 7, at 354.
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Mills v. Everest Reinsurance Co., 410 F. Supp. 2d 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); Foxley v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1224, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (claim for rescis-
sion based on mistake made by purchaser of inauthentic painting at auction was time-
barred when the rescission claim was brought more than six years after the auction oc-
curred); Prand Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 878 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)
(rescission claim based on mistake brought more than six years after contract was executed
was untimely); Zavaglia v. Gardner, 666 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (reversing
trial court’s judgment of rescission based on mistake concerning a contract executed more
than six years before suit was brought, and thus falling outside the applicable statute of
limitations); First Nat’l Bank of Rochester v. Volpe, 629 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995) (finding that cause of action for reformation based on mutual mistake asserted in
amended complaint was untimely).
102. 410 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
103. Id. at 245.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 246.
106. Id. at 249.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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tract is not executed until later, however, in the reinsurance context,
the limitations period accrues from the date of agreement on the es-
sential terms.109 The reinsurer argued that the parties agreed on the
essential terms when they executed the binder.110
The binder contained the following items: the parties’ identities;
the subject matter of the agreement; the insured risk; the risk’s dura-
tion; the coverage amount; and the premium amount.111 The court
decided that these items were “material to a reinsurance contract.”112
Despite this, the rehabilitator put forth two reasons why the
binder did not constitute the contract between the reinsurer and the
insurance company.113 The rehabilitator argued that the terms of a
related trust agreement were not agreed upon when the binder was
issued.114 In addition, the rehabilitator pointed to the fact that the
reinsurer unilaterally modified the definition of a term in the Reinsur-
ance Confirmation, which constituted a counter-offer that was not ac-
cepted until after the binder was issued.115
The court rejected the rehabilitator’s first argument by finding
that when the binder was issued, the parties had agreed to the essen-
tial terms of the trust agreement and that performance under the re-
insurance contract began immediately upon the binder being signed,
“with the understanding that the Trust Agreement . . . would fol-
low.”116 As to the rehabilitator’s second argument that the reinsurer
had made a counter-offer, the court found that the alleged counter-
offer was not made until after the parties entered into their agree-
ment.117 The “change was at most a proposed modification of an al-
ready-existing contract.”118 Thus, this argument was also unavailing,
and the court held that the limitations period began to run from
when the binder was issued.119
As demonstrated above, even if the limitations period is mea-
sured from the time the mistake was made (i.e., when the contract was
formed), there can still be complicated disputes for the court and liti-
109. Id. at 250.
110. Id. at 249.
111. Id. at 250.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 251.
117. Id. at 252.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 254–55.
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gants to work through. Another example of such a dispute is when the
claim for rescission based on mistake is first asserted in an amended
complaint, and that amended complaint is presented outside of the
limitations period.
When amending a complaint to state a claim for rescission based
on mistake, and the limitations period has run between the time the
original complaint was filed and when the motion to amend was filed,
the plaintiff may have a difficult time making the argument that the
amended complaint should relate back to the date the original com-
plaint was filed.120 In First National Bank of Rochester v. Volpe,121 the
plaintiff unsuccessfully made this very argument.122 The plaintiff’s
amended complaint that proposed a claim based on mistake was filed
more than six years after the mistake was made.123 In rejecting the
plaintiff’s relation-back argument, even though the original complaint
was filed within the limitations period, the court first noted that, in its
jurisdiction, the time for bringing a claim based on mistake does not
begin to accrue when the mistake was either discovered or should
have been discovered.124 Instead, it begins to accrue when the mistake
was made.125 The court specifically stated the mistake was made when
the contract was executed.126 The court then found that the claim
based on mutual mistake asserted in the proposed amended com-
plaint did not relate back to the original complaint because the origi-
nal complaint only alleged the defendants had breached the contract
and “did not give notice of the same transactions or occurrences
sought to be proved by the proposed amendment, which alleges a mis-
take in the formation or articulation of the contract . . . .”127
Thus, parties that wish to amend their complaints beyond the
limitations period must first determine if their proposed amendments
will relate back to their timely original complaints. It appears that sim-
ply arguing the defendants had some notice of a mutual mistake claim
based on a breach of contract complaint will not carry the day. A
120. Under the relation back doctrine, an amended pleading filed outside of the limi-
tations period is considered filed as of the date of the timely filed original complaint, thus
preventing dismissal of the amended complaint due to the running of the limitations pe-
riod. 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 275 (2009). In order to relate back to the original
complaint, though, courts will not permit any changes whatsoever to the pleading. See id.
121. 629 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 907–08.
124. Id. at 908.
125. Id. at 907.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 908.
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breach of contract cause of action presupposes a valid contract existed
and is recognized by the plaintiff as existing.128 Bringing an action for
breach of contract does not suggest the plaintiff believes the contract
is voidable by mutual mistake. Pleading breach of contract necessarily
tells the defendant that the plaintiff, at the very least, recognizes the
existence of the contract. A breach of contract claim therefore pro-
vides absolutely no notice to the defendant that at some point in the
future, the plaintiff will contend there was a mistake in formation so
severe as to render the contract voidable.
At first glance, the rule that a claim for rescission based upon
mistake accrues when the mistake was made seems draconian. After
all, it provides no relief for the circumstance when the mistake was not
discovered until after the limitations period runs. This seems unfair,
because how can one expect a party to a contract founded upon a
mistake to pursue a claim for rescission when that party did not know
it had one? Suppose for example that the parties enter into a contract
for the sale of property in 2000, both believing the property is not
subject to rent control.129 In 2007, the buyer discovers the property is
subject to rent control.130 If the statute of limitations is six years,131
the buyer cannot pursue rescission based on mistake, even though the
delay in filing suit for rescission was not due to dragging one’s feet or
done with malicious intent, as the mistake occurred when the contract
was executed, which was more than six years prior to actual discovery
of the mistake. Here, the buyer, who has arguably not done anything
wrong, still suffers the injury produced by the mistake, i.e., possessing
a piece of property that does not fit the qualifications of what the
buyer thought he received.
The above example seems to indicate that setting the time for
accrual of rescission based on mistake as of the date the contract was
executed has no redeeming qualities. Such is not the case, however.
The first and most obvious advantage to setting the date as of the time
the contract was made is that it is, in most cases, a clear time.132 Al-
though an allegedly innocent party may be precluded from bringing
the claim for rescission, both parties are spared the time and expense
128. See Coram Healthcare Corp. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 589,
593 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
129. See Zavaglia v. Gardner, 666 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
130. Here, the example differs somewhat from Zavaglia. There, the discovery that the
property was subject to rent control occurred within one year of the contract. Id.
131. See id.
132. See Stephen V. O’Neal, Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: California’s Dis-
covery Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 68 CAL. L. REV. 106, 116 (1980).
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of litigation, as they can clearly determine whether the rescission
claim is barred as untimely even before the complaint is filed. Addi-
tionally, in the above example of the rent-controlled property, it is the
new buyer that now has the most opportunities and incentives to en-
sure that no mistakes were made in the description of the property
that he bought. The new buyer is now the one entitled to possession
(and thus, unhampered inspection) of the property. The seller, on
the other hand, has relinquished all her rights to the property, and
thus could not examine it after the contract is executed to see if it
comports with her beliefs. Having a certain, easily calculable date
forces the buyer to be diligent in ensuring the property meets his ex-
pectations in entering into the contract to purchase, even after con-
clusion of the transaction.133
This rule also benefits the seller. If the seller is the party to the
contract that is harmed by the mistake, then the onus is on her to
discover such facts before the contract is executed, when she has the
best chance and opportunity to prevent the contract from being
formed in the first place. For example, the seller of land may not
know there is drillable oil under the ground on her piece of prop-
erty.134 By setting forth the rule that rescission based on mistake must
be brought within a definite time period of when the contract was
formed, the seller knows she must ascertain the true character and
value of her property before the contract to sell the property is exe-
cuted, and while the property is still within her control and easily ac-
cessible for inspections.135 In addition, “if not in every particular case,
the owner will have access at lower cost than the buyer to information
about the characteristics of [her] property and can therefore avoid
mistakes about these characteristics more cheaply than prospective
buyers can.”136 Therefore, setting a clear and definite date as to when
the claim for rescission based on mistake begins to run does not work
such an injustice as could be initially perceived from the first example
given.137
133. See id. (using a date certain “creates a strong incentive for timely action by plain-
tiffs, thus furthering the policy concerns central to the statutes of limitation”).
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 cmts. a, d (1981).
135. This comports with the Restatement of Contracts that allocates risk to the seller in
such a situation. See id.
136. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 104 (7th ed. 2007).
137. In addition, equitable tolling of the limitations period may be applicable in situa-
tions where the other party to the contract takes steps to prevent the injured party from
discovering the mistake. See 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 115 (2009).
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A bright-line rule is in the best interests of the party seeking re-
scission, the party opposing rescission, and the courts. First, the
bright-line rule, as discussed above, makes it easier for the party want-
ing rescission to determine if she actually can pursue a rescission
claim that is not barred by the limitations period. In most cases, she
need not go through costly discovery to determine when the contract
was executed. Therefore, she can use her resources to pursue other
claims that would have merit, as opposed to expending her resources
to pursue a claim that may or may not succeed. Second, the bright-
line rule benefits the party against whom rescission is brought in that
that party need not worry about defending a stale claim for rescission,
including trying to locate witnesses that have long since relocated or
died. Once the time period beyond the contract execution date has
passed, the presumptive defendant can rest assured that he will not be
forced to defend a claim with limited evidence. Finally, establishing
that the cause of action for rescission based on mistake accrues when
the contract was formed aids the court in keeping out cases for rescis-
sion that would require tricky evidentiary issues, such as which side to
believe when neither side can present a witness to the contract forma-
tion. A clear rule also necessarily restricts the number of claims for
rescission that can be brought, thus reducing the load of an already
overburdened court system.
E. Rather than a Specific Act Triggering the Accrual of the
Limitations Period, Rescission Must Be Sought Within a
Reasonable Time
Some courts follow the rule that rescission must be sought within
a reasonable time, rather than any set time period.138 The reasonable
time requirement has been applied in the context of waiving the right
to rescission, as opposed to whether the limitations period has run.139
In Henson v. James M. Barker Co.,140 the court applied a reasonable
time requirement, rather than a strict time period. In Henson, the ap-
pellants entered into a construction contract with the appellee.141
During the course of construction, the parties had a dispute and even-
tually executed a take-over agreement, whereby another construction
company replaced the appellee on the project.142 The appellants al-
138. See Miller v. Reynolds, 223 S.E.2d 883, 886 (Va. 1976).
139. Henson v. James M. Barker Co., 636 So. 2d 887, 888–89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
140. Id. at 888.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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leged that they ended up paying $200,000 more than they expected
on the construction project due to the appellee’s construction de-
fects.143 The appellants sought rescission of the take-over agreement,
but the trial court found their delay in seeking rescission resulted in a
waiver of the claim.144
On appeal, the appellants argued the trial court incorrectly ap-
plied laches to the rescission claim.145 The appellate court stated the
trial court did not apply laches but instead, found the appellants had
waived their claim for rescission.146 The appellate court noted that the
waiver defense to a rescission action “has long been recognized in
Florida law.”147 Although the appellants filed suit for rescission less
than two years after receiving notice of the construction defects, the
attempted rescission occurred only after the appellee demanded pay-
ment on the promissory note supporting the take-over agreement and
after the construction was complete.148 Thus, the appellate court de-
termined the trial court did not err in finding that appellants waived
any right to rescission of the take-over agreement, as rescission was
not sought until after the appellee tried to collect its money due
under the agreement.149
Although the Henson court rejected the contention that failure to
seek rescission in a reasonable time period is the same as a laches
argument,150 the court in Miller v. Reynolds151 did consider the reason-
able time period as applicable to a laches defense.152 The plaintiffs in
the Miller case sought rescission based on the mutual mistake of the
parties that the land the plaintiffs purchased from the defendants was
suitable for building a residence.153 The plaintiffs learned this one
year after executing the contract to purchase the land.154
In responding to the defendants’ laches argument, the court
stated that, for the most part, rescission must be sought within a rea-
sonable time.155 The court determined the plaintiffs’ rescission claim
143. Id.
144. Id. at 888–89.
145. Id. at 889.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 223 S.E.2d 883 (Va. 1976).
152. Id. at 886.
153. Id. at 883–84.
154. Id. at 884.
155. Id. at 886.
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was not barred by laches because the plaintiffs learned of the unsuita-
bility of the land within eleven months of the execution of the deed to
the property, and the plaintiffs filed suit immediately after discovering
the problem.156
Thus, in contrast to Henson, the court in Miller considered the
reasonable time criteria in the context of the argument that the limi-
tations period barred the claim, not in terms of a waiver of the rescis-
sion claim.157
The reasonable time requirement is heavily criticized in Sol
Goodell’s 1930 Texas Law Review article Need Rescission Be Sought
Within a Reasonable Time?158 Goodell explores the reasonable time re-
quirement under Texas law.159 At the time the article was written,
Texas’s statute of limitations of four years applied to all actions unless
specifically enumerated in a different statute.160 As rescission did not
have a specific statute applying a limitations period, Goodell argues
the four-year limitation should apply to it and, by imposing a reasona-
ble time requirement, the court was usurping the statutorily provided
time period.161
Goodell’s main complaint regarding using a reasonable time pe-
riod is that it causes unnecessary confusion.162 In most cases where
rescission was denied due to the passage of time, it was because the
delay resulted in some sort of harm either because the actions of the
party seeking rescission indicated that party’s intention to affirm the
contract, rather than rescind it, or the delay caused the parties to be
unable to be returned to the status quo.163 If a reasonable time period
in which to seek rescission is required, then it is not clear whether this
is a defense to rescission or something that the party seeking rescis-
sion must prove.164 In addition, if the reasonable time requirement is
a separate defense, then it would conflict with the statute of limita-
tions.165 Finally, in determining whether rescission was sought within
a reasonable time, it would seem that the important consideration
156. Id.
157. See also Courtois v. Millard, 529 N.E.2d 77, 81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the plaintiffs did not unreasonably
delay in bringing their claim for rescission, and thus laches did not preclude the claim).
158. Goodell, supra note 7.
159. Id. at 355–70.
160. Id. at 348.
161. Id. at 356.
162. Id. at 357.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 357, 361–62.
165. Id. at 357.
Spring 2010] RESCISSION & THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 777
would be whether prejudice resulted from the delay.166 If true, then
the courts should simply discuss the prejudice aspect, without causing
confusion by using the reasonable time language.167
The reasonable time requirement could also result in harm to the
party seeking rescission.168 For example, although the plaintiff
brought her rescission claim within the statute of limitations, a jury
could find that the time period she waited before bringing the claim
was not reasonable.169 If the jury made this finding, even though there
was no prejudice to the defendant, then “it would be unjust to allow a
jury to bar the suit in less time than that prescribed by the statute of
limitation.”170 As with almost all of the methods for determining when
a claim for rescission begins to accrue for statute of limitations pur-
poses, the reasonable time period solution has many disadvantages.
IV. Solutions to Limitation Period Problems
Various approaches to applying limitations periods to rescission
claims have been discussed, but all of the approaches have advantages
and disadvantages. Most of the pros and cons of the different theories
come from determining when the claim for rescission should begin to
accrue. There are several solutions to this problem. One is to recog-
nize rescission as a remedy, and to consequently deal with the limita-
tions period from that perspective. The other is to do away with any
limitations period whatsoever, and instead require the defendant to
prove the time period in which the plaintiff waited in bringing the
claim for rescission caused the defendant harm.
As an alternative to these proposed solutions, the courts could
determine the limitations period should begin to run when the action
supporting the rescission claim occurred.
A. Rescission as a Remedy—Not a Cause of Action
Rescission is not a cause of action, but instead is a remedy.171 If a
remedy requires a condition precedent, the occurrence of that condi-
tion does not delay the running of the limitations period for the cause
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 363.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Bischoff v. Cook, 185 P.3d 902, 911 (Haw. Ct. App. 2008); McGarvey v. Penske
Auto. Group, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 2d 450, 466 (D.N.J. 2009).
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of action upon which the remedy is based.172 In Swing v. Barnard-Cope
Manufacturing Co.,173 an Ohio court issued a decree in 1901 that poli-
cyholders were liable for the debt of a company.174 The trustee was
able to bring an action against the policyholders for the assessments
thirty days after giving the policyholders notice of the assessment.175
The trustee commenced the actions against the policyholders more
than six years after the Ohio court’s decree was issued, which would
be beyond the statute of limitations if the date of the Ohio court’s
decree was when the limitations period began to run.176 To defeat the
statute of limitations defense, the trustee argued its cause of action
did not accrue until the thirty-day notice was given, which was within
six years of filing suit.177
The Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected this argument.178 In-
stead, the court determined it was the decree that created the cause of
action.179 The trustee could not delay giving the notice, and thus de-
lay the accrual of the cause of action, “practically annul[ling] the stat-
ute of limitations.”180 As the court put it, although the time to bring
suit begins to run when the cause of action accrues, “[i]t does not
necessarily follow that the right to sue on the cause of action arises
immediately when” this happens.181 The giving of notice was a part of
the remedy, and not a part of the cause of action.182 The notice was a step
in collecting the assessments, and thus part of the remedy.183 Conse-
quently, because giving notice was not part of the cause of action, the
failure to give notice did not delay the accrual of the cause of ac-
tion.184 Thus, the trustee’s attempt to collect the assessments was
barred by the statute of limitations, even though the notice was given
within the limitations period.185
Under Swing, if rescission is a remedy, rather than a cause of ac-
tion, then the plaintiff would lose the ability to control when the limi-
172. Swing v. Barnard-Cope Mfg. Co., 131 N.W. 855, 855–56 (Minn. 1911).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 855.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 856.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 855.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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tations period begins to run. As discussed earlier in Part III.A. of this
Article, if the limitations period begins to run when the last element
of the claim occurs, then a plaintiff could control when the rescission
claim begins to run by delaying giving notice of the intent to re-
scind.186 The Swing court noted this problem, and its solution was to
hold that giving the notice was part of the remedy, not part of the cause
of action.187
That same court later determined that a condition precedent to a
remedy should also be performed within the limitations period.188 In
Weston v. Jones,189 money was paid to the petitioner pursuant to a court
decree that was entered under a mistake of fact.190 The respondent
sought return of the money beyond the limitations period, but argued
that the limitations period did not begin to run until the original
court decree was reversed.191 The court disagreed, instead finding
that reversing the original court decree was a step in the remedy, not a
step in the respondent’s cause of action, stating that “the decree stood
as a barrier between [the respondent] and the remedy the law pro-
vided.”192 In ruling against the respondent, the court determined that
a condition precedent to a remedy must also “be performed within
the statutory period for bringing the action.”193
As rescission is a remedy, it should be treated like one in applying
limitations periods. The requirements of rescission that there be no-
tice and a return of the benefits received under the contract are thus
steps in the remedy, and therefore must be performed within the limi-
tations period.194 Under Weston, treating rescission as a remedy re-
quires the plaintiff to complete all of the necessary conditions
precedent to receiving rescission within the limitations period. Thus,
for the court to rescind the contract, the plaintiff must show that
within the five years prior to asking for rescission, she accomplished
all of the following: (1) that a contract was entered into by the parties;
(2) that a ground for rescission exists, such as mutual mistake; (3) that
she rescinded the contract and notified the other party of the rescis-
186. See supra Part III.A.
187. Swing, 131 N.W. at 855–56.
188. Weston v. Jones, 199 N.W. 431, 433 (Minn. 1924).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 432.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 433.
193. Id.
194. See id.
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sion; and (4) that she returned the benefits she received under the
contract.195
This approach has several benefits. First, it will give certainty to
the litigants, as the specific amount of time to accomplish the ele-
ments of rescission will be clearly known. Second, statutes of limita-
tions are enacted by the legislature,196 so careful policy considerations
underlie them,197 and this proposal would give effect to those consid-
erations by keeping the time periods the legislature determined as the
time within which all elements of rescission must be accomplished.
Finally, this approach takes control of the running of the statute of
limitations out of the plaintiff’s hands. All steps of the rescission rem-
edy must be accomplished within the limitations period, and the
plaintiff cannot control when the contract was made or when the basis
for rescission happened.
There are also disadvantages to this approach. First, this ap-
proach dictates that rescission is only available if it is sought within so
many years of the contract being executed, as one of the elements—
conditions precedent—to rescission is the making of a contract.198
This could result in an unfair situation, such as when impossibility of
performance of the contract arises beyond that time period.199 Sec-
ond, the court would need to determine when every element of the
claim for rescission occurred to determine if the remedy was timely
sought. This results in a significant expenditure of time and money, as
contrasted with only having to determine when one element
occurred.
B. Delay Bars Rescission Only if Prejudical to the Opposing Party
Another solution to the problem of applying limitations periods
to rescission is to not have any limitations period whatsoever. Instead,
the court could put the onus on the defendant to demonstrate that
195. See supra Part I.
196. Goodell, supra note 7, at 359.
197. See id. at 359 (The legislature that provides a specific limitations period for rescis-
sion claims defines the state’s public policy regarding those claims, “[w]hen [it] . . . bal-
ance[es] the hardships that might be caused by delay in bringing suit against the duty to
protect the rights of the public, and tak[es] into consideration the nature of the evidence
by which a particular cause of action may be established . . . .”).
198. The same issue arises when establishing the statute of limitations as running from
the date the mistake is made, i.e., the date the contract was formed. See supra Part III.C.
199. See id.
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she has been injured by the delay in bringing suit, regardless of
whether the time in bringing suit was long or short.200
There are two major problems with this approach. First, it pro-
vides no certainty to the parties. In determining whether the defen-
dant was prejudiced by the delay, the courts will necessarily proceed
on a case-by-case basis. For example, if one of the witnesses to the
contract formation has passed away, but the other has not, is the de-
fendant still prejudiced by the delay? The parties will have to proceed
with the litigation to find out whether the defendant will be consid-
ered so harmed by the delay that the plaintiff may not maintain the
rescission claim. Also, in most cases the plaintiff cannot determine on
her own whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. This in-
formation may not be known to the plaintiff until litigation com-
mences. Thus, the plaintiff has to resort to litigation to determine if
she even has a viable claim for rescission. This results in a waste of
judicial resources—and the parties’ resources—that could have been
avoided if a bright-line rule was followed.
Second, requiring the defendant to demonstrate prejudice is the
basis for laches.201 Florida, for example, has eliminated this require-
ment from laches, as demonstrated by section 95.11(b) of the Florida
Statute, which states that laches may still bar a plaintiff from bringing
his claim regardless of whether the delay injured the defendant. Spe-
cifically eliminating the requirement of prejudice evinces a decision
by the legislature to disregard whether a defendant was injured due to
the passage of time. Instead, it demonstrates that the legislature con-
siders the passage of time to be more important than whether the
defendant was injured by it. Because the legislature has made this de-
termination, it is not recommended that the defendant need only
show harm caused by the delay to preclude rescission; instead, a set
time period within which the plaintiff must bring the claim for rescis-
sion should be established, regardless of whether the defendant suf-
fered harm due to the delay.
C. The Limitations Period Should Begin to Run from the Date of
the Action That Supports the Rescission Claim
A better solution to the problem in applying limitations periods
to rescission is to have the time begin to run from the date of the act
that provides a basis for rescission, as in those jurisdictions where the
200. Goodell, supra note 7, at 360.
201. See supra Part II.
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time period begins to run from the date that the mistake was made.
This eliminates the plaintiff’s ability to control when the limitations
period begins to run. In addition, in most situations involving rescis-
sion, it establishes a bright-line rule.
For rescission claims, the time period would thus run from the
basis for rescission, which would be the date the mistake was made,
the date the fraud occurred, the date the false representation was
made, or the date the performance of the contract became impossible
or impracticable.
California has somewhat adopted this approach.202 Section
337(3) of the California Code of Civil Procedure states that the time
to bring a claim for rescission of a written contract is four years, and
that “[t]he time begins to run from the date upon which the facts that
entitle the aggrieved party to rescind occurred.”203 The acts that jus-
tify rescission include fraud, false representations, and mistake,204 but
California has specifically exempted those grounds from this require-
ment. Instead, section 337(3) states, “Where the ground for rescission
is fraud or mistake, the time does not begin to run until the discovery
by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake.”205
Even where the rescission is based on mistake, however, having
the time period begin to run from the date the mistake was made,
which is usually when the contract was executed, in most cases pro-
vides a simple, certain date from which to begin calculating. Although
in some circumstances it can result in an unfair situation, these rare
instances do not outweigh its benefits.206
In cases where the rescission is based on fraud, the time period
for the running of the statute of limitations would begin from the date
the fraud occurred. If the fraud is ongoing, then the limitations pe-
riod would not begin until the last time the fraud was perpetrated.
202. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337(3) (West 2006).
203. Id.
204. See supra Part I.
205. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337(3) (West 2006). The section also includes another
exception for rescission based on misrepresentation under a specific section of California’s
Insurance Code. Id.
206. But see O’Neal, supra note 132, at 116–20 (arguing that the plaintiff that exercises
diligence in discovering the basis for her claim should not lose her claim due to the bene-
fits of establishing a clear-cut rule).
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For example, an oil company contracts to sell a piece of property,
but conceals oil field waste and trash on the property.207 The pur-
chaser only discovers the contaminants when he has a soil investiga-
tion performed.208 In this situation, the limitations period would
begin to run when the contract to purchase was entered into, as that is
when the fraud occurred, rather than when the purchaser discovered
the contaminants. If the purchaser’s discovery occurred outside of the
limitations period, then his claim for rescission would be time-barred,
even though he did not discover the fraud until later.
Although this is a harsh result, as it precludes a claim before the
purchaser knew he had one, its benefits outweigh its disadvantages.
The time period is easily calculable, and thus the purchaser is en-
couraged to fully investigate his new property before that time period
elapses. Because it is an easily calculable date, the purchaser knows
exactly how long he has to complete the necessary actions to investi-
gate his property, assuming he did not do so before entering into the
contract to purchase it. In addition, although the remedy of rescission
might be precluded by the limitations period, other potential claims
against the perpetrator of the fraud might be timely.
False representation, as a basis for rescinding a contract, is similar
to fraud, but with one important distinction. Where fraud requires
intent to deceive, a party may be entitled to rescission of a contract
where the other party made false statements without knowledge of
their falsity or any intent to deceive.209 In rescission claims based upon
false representations, “[a]ll that need be shown under such circum-
stances is that the representations were false and actually misled the
person to whom they were made.”210
The limitations period for a rescission claim based on a false rep-
resentation should begin to run when the representation was made.
Certainly, a disadvantage to this approach would be the possibility that
an innocent party could be prevented from seeking rescission even if
her claim was sought within the limitations period if that period was
measured from the date the contract was executed, rather than the
207. This example is based on Galen v. Mobil Oil Corp., 922 F. Supp. 318 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
208.  See id. at 321.
209. Ellenburg v. Edward K. Love Realty Co., 59 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Mo. 1933).
210. Id. at 627. False representation also differs from mistake in that a rescission claim
based on mistake technically does not require that any representation be made. All that is
required is that the parties operated under a mistake, as in the situation where the seller
sells land without knowing that it contains drillable oil beneath the surface. See discussion
at Part III.D supra.
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date of the false representation. This might occur if the representa-
tion was made prior to the formation of the contract.
The disadvantages are outweighed by the advantages, however.
Having the limitations period for rescission accrue from the date the
false representation was made provides a clear deadline. In most, if
not all, cases, the parties will be able to identify which representation
was false. Although the parties may dispute when the representation
was made, litigation involving this issue should be relatively simple, as
it requires only a determination of the communications between the
parties to the contract, and may be shown by letters or e-mails, tele-
phone records, or meetings between the parties, of which there
should be evidence independent of the parties’ testimony.
For rescission cases based on impossibility of performance, the
time should begin to run from the date the performance becomes
impossible. That may be when the contract is formed, if there was
never any possibility the contract could be performed, or it may be at
some later time. For example, parties may agree to transfer their
rights to sell certain items in a particular geographic area.211 If those
rights were, in fact, nontransferable, then it would be impossible to
perform a contract to transfer those rights.212 Theoretically, a party
seeking to transfer those rights obtained them before entering into
the contract. Thus, the contract to transfer the nontransferable rights
was impossible to perform from the moment it was executed, and the
limitations period would begin to run from the date the contract was
formed.
In contrast, parties may execute a contract for one party to pro-
vide dancing lessons to the other party.213 Following execution of the
contract, the party that was to receive the lessons could become physi-
cally disabled and unable dance.214 In such a situation, the time to
bring a claim for rescission would run from the date the party became
physically disabled, rather than the date that the contract was formed,
as the date of the disability is the date that the contract became impos-
sible to perform.
As demonstrated by the above examples, using the time that per-
formance of the contract becomes impossible establishes a bright-line
rule that is easy to apply, thus leading to certainty to the parties and
211. See E.B. Sherman, Inc. v. Mirizio, 556 So. 2d 1143, 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
This case is the basis of this example.
212. See id.
213. See Richardson v. Cole, 173 So. 2d 336, 337 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
214. See id. at 337–38.
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judicial efficiency, as litigation would be unnecessary to determine
whether the limitations period expired based on when it began to
run. In addition, such a rule solves the problem posed by the hypo-
thetical outlined at the beginning of this Article, in that in most cir-
cumstances the party seeking rescission would not be able to control
the time when the contract becomes impossible to perform.
Conclusion
There are currently several issues involved in applying limitations
periods to claims for rescission, not the least of which is the ability of
the party seeking rescission to control when the limitations period be-
gins to run. This problem could be solved by several methods. The
courts could start treating rescission as the remedy that it is, and hold
that all of the elements to rescission must be performed within the
limitations period, rather than treating rescission as a cause of action
and determining that the time period does not begin to run until the
last element is accomplished. Another idea is for the courts to not
require any time period, but instead put the onus on the defendant to
demonstrate how she has been harmed by the delay, however short or
long the delay was. The best approach, however, is to have the limita-
tions period begin to run from the date of the act supporting the
claim for rescission. This establishes a fair, easy-to-apply, and bright-
line rule for the litigants and the court, thus saving the parties and the
courts time and money.
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